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ABSTRACT
A few years after the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mecha-
nism, the General Court of the European Union, in its new supervisory 
role, annulled for the first time the decisions adopted by the European 
Central Bank (ECB). These judgments are of particular interest because 
they allow a preliminary investigation of the intensity of judicial review 
of the ECB’s discretionary choices in the field of banking supervision. This 
article claims that the first case law of the General Court points to several 
interesting developments and indicates the resolve to carry out a judicial 
review which, although adhering strictly to the “limited review” standard, 
does not shy away from developing judicial techniques to ensure a more 
incisive scrutiny of the discretion enjoyed by the ECB. Despite the novelty 
of the issues brought to the attention of the EU judges, it seems possible 
as a result of this study to envisage, on the one hand, a gradual alignment 
of the scrutiny of supervisory decisions with those emerged in relation to 
the Commission’s decisions on competition matters. On the other hand, 
a differentiation from the “light touch” approach adopted in the field of 
monetary policy can be observed.
Keywords: complex economic assessment, Court of Justice of the EU, European 
Central Bank, supervisory decisions, intensity of judicial review, leverage 
ratio, margin of discretion
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1 Introduction
A few years after the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM), the General Court of the European Union annulled for the first time 
decisions adopted by the European Central Bank (ECB) within its new super-
1 The author wishes to thank Prof. Anna Simonati and the two anonymous referees for their 
helpful comments and constructive suggestions. Errors and omissions remain solely mine.
Magliari, A. (2019). Intensity of Judicial Review of the European Central Banks’s 
Supervisory Decisions. 
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visory role2. These judgments are of particular interest because they allow a 
preliminary investigation of the intensity of the judicial review of the ECB’s 
discretion in the field of banking supervision.
As is well known, the SSM was introduced by Regulation (EU) no. 1024/2013 
(the “SSM Regulation”) as a response to the financial crisis of the Eurozone 
within the scope of the European Banking Union project (Chiti M.P. and San-
toro, 2019; Lo Schiavo, 2019; Chiti E. and Vesperini, 2015). The SSM comprises 
a complex administrative system of banking supervision including the ECB 
as the responsible authority for ensuring the effective and consistent func-
tioning of the Mechanism and the national supervisory authorities of the par-
ticipating Member States. Notably, the ECB is endowed with a wide set of 
supervisory tasks and powers with a view to contributing to the safety and 
soundness of credit institutions in the Eurozone, as well as to the stability of 
the financial system within the Union.
In the performance of these tasks, the ECB is empowered to adopt legal 
measures directly addressed to private parties and capable of impacting their 
fundamental rights (Zilioli, 2017; Lamandini, Ramos Muñoz and Solana Álva-
rez, 2015). It becomes therefore essential to ensure that full and effective 
judicial protection is guaranteed to individuals in respect of such supervisory 
decisions. Among the various issues related to the judicial protection of the 
addressees of the ECB banking supervision (Chiti M.P., 2019; Cassese et al., 
2018; Brescia Morra, 2016; Arons, 2015; Annunziata, 2019), little attention 
has so far been paid to the question of the intensity of judicial scrutiny on ECB 
supervisory decisions. Building upon the analysis of the first judgments of the 
General Court, the present article aims to contribute to the academic debate 
on the standards of judicial control of discretionary measures in the field of 
EU banking supervision.
2 The issue of the intensity of judicial review in banking 
supervision: questions and methods
The question of the intensity of the judicial scrutiny on the power of ap-
praisal and on the complex technical assessments falling within the remit of 
EU administrative bodies has been widely debated by EU legal scholars (in 
particular, Craig, 2018, ch. 15; Schwarze, 2006; Baran, 2017; Fritzsche, 2010), 
especially with regard to the Court of Justice’s review of European Commis-
sion decisions in matters of competition and state aid (da Cruz Vilaça, 2018; 
Derenne and Merola, 2012; Bailey, 2004; Kalintiri, 2016).
In this respect, it is well known that when EU bodies and institutions enjoy 
a wide margin of discretion, the Courts carry out a “marginal” rather than a 
“comprehensive” judicial review, in the sense that the latter is limited to veri-
fying the observance of the procedural rules, the obligation to state reasons, 
2 General Court of the European Union, section II (extended), 13 July 2018, Case T-733/16, La 
Banque postale v ECB; T-745/16, BPCE v ECB; T-757/16, Société générale v. ECB; T-751/16, Confé-
dération nationale du Crédit mutuel v ECB; T-758/16, Crédit agricole SA v ECB; T-768/16, BNP 
Paribas v ECB.
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the material accuracy of the facts, and the absence of errors in law or manifest 
errors of assessment or misuse of powers (Prek and Lefèvre, 2019). Over the 
years, however, the EU judiciary has gradually refined its judicial review tech-
niques, becoming less deferent to the margin of discretion conferred on the 
administration, albeit remaining formally anchored to a scrutiny that makes 
no attempt to substitute the Court’s assessment for that of the public author-
ity according to the formula of the “marginal” standard of review (Meij, 2009)3.
As noted above, the assignment of important executive tasks to the ECB in 
the field of banking supervision raises interesting questions that, given the 
absolute novelty of the SSM, have not yet been satisfactorily answered. A key 
question is whether the EU judges will apply the same standard of control to 
supervisory decisions as it has done to ECB’s monetary policy measures, or 
whether the Court’s review of eminently individual decisions addressed to sin-
gle credit institutions or single persons will emulate the approach developed 
over time in the field of antitrust law. One may, in fact, wonder whether the 
EU judges will be ready to handle new and complex subject matters such as 
banking supervision and financial law, and whether they will gain the neces-
sary expertise to carry out a thorough judicial review. Ultimately, it might well 
be asked whether – and on the basis of what itinerary – the EU judges will apply 
a judicial control that ensures in-depth appraisal of the discretionary choices 
made by the banking supervisory authority. These questions are of particular 
relevance since banking supervision involves both complex technical assess-
ments and policy considerations: the former underpins the substantive rules 
applied by the supervisor; the latter is embedded in the need to balance di-
vergent interests (public and private, national and supranational) throughout 
the decision-making process. Indeed, one may argue that the ECB’s power of 
appraisal is not limited to conducting a purely objective – and as such neutral 
– assessment of technical and legal prerequisites, as it also encompasses a 
wider lato sensu political dimension, as expressly recognised by Article 127(6) 
TFEU, which lays down that the ECB may be assigned “specific tasks […] con-
cerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions”.
As is known, EU law does not clearly distinguish between “administrative 
discretion” (or discretion proper) and “technical discretion”. While such dis-
tinction is well established in some Member States, like Germany and Italy4 
(Bachof, 1955; de Pretis, 1995), in the EU the two dimensions are commonly 
understood as part of the general phenomenon of the freedom of choice/
appraisal left to decision-makers in the enforcement of EU law by a higher-
ranking legal source. Both types of discretion are indeed treated as a homog-
enous concept and made subject to the same “marginal” standard of judicial 
review (Schwarze, 2006). In fact, although EU Courts make use of different ex-
3 A more incisive judicial review of decisions on concentrations was initially tackled by the Court 
of First Instance in the well-known Cases T-342/99, Airtours v Commission; T-310/01, Schneider 
Electric v Commission and T-5/02, Tetra Laval v Commission, this latter decision subsequently 
confirmed by the Court of Justice, C-12/03 P, Tetra Laval, 15 February 2005.
4 This distinction is a feature of German law, which makes a distinction between “Ermessen” and 
“unbestimmter	Rechtsbegriff”, as well as of Italian law, distinguishing between “discrezionalità 
amministrativa” and “discrezionalità tecnica”. 
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pressions, such as “margin of appraisal”, “power of appraisal” and “margin of 
discretion”, one may argue that they do not attach any distinct consequence 
to each of them. Even in EU legal scholarship, there seems to be no consensus 
on such distinction (Prek and Lefèvre, 2019; Mendes, 2017; Bouveresse, 2010; 
Caranta, 2008; Schwarze, 2006). However, it is argued that the EU judicature 
should make the effort to develop a more analytical approach to the subject, 
by acknowledging different forms and intensities of “discretion” and, based 
on this, deriving different strategies of judicial review.
It is certainly beyond the scope of this article to elaborate a general theory 
on discretion in EU law. It is submitted, however, that the case law stemming 
from the new ECB supervisory tasks, given the particular intertwining of tech-
nical elements and policy evaluations, could actually contribute to the elabo-
ration of a more structured judicial review of discretionary choices of EU bod-
ies and institutions.
Against this background, the present article argues that the first General 
Court case law points to several interesting developments, as it indicates the 
Court’s resolve to carry out a judicial review which, while adhering to the “lim-
ited review” standard, does not shy away from developing judicial techniques 
to ensure a more incisive scrutiny of the discretion enjoyed by the ECB, espe-
cially when it comes to checking its technical assessments.
3 The leverage ratio and the French “livret a” judgments: 
preliminary results from the first case law
A brief summary of the case which led to the annulment of the ECB decisions 
is useful for a better understanding of the General Court’s reasoning, as well 
as for providing evidence of the complex interweaving of technical assess-
ments and policy considerations.
In the years preceding the financial crisis, many credit institutions funded a 
substantial percentage of their investments through loans. With the advent 
of the crisis, however, severe losses and funding difficulties led to excessive 
exposures compared to equity, with the result that many credit institutions 
were forced to make hasty sales of some of their assets in order to reduce 
their exposures.
It was within this framework that Regulation no. 575/20135 (the Capital Re-
quirements Regulation, or CRR) introduced a new prudential regulatory tool, 
the leverage ratio, as a further measure to add to the requirements estab-
lished by the Basel II rules6. More specifically, Art. 429(2) CRR provides that 
“the leverage ratio shall be calculated as an institution’s capital measure di-
5 Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms.
6 The “leverage” is defined in Art. 4(1)(93) CRR as “the relative size of an institution’s assets, 
off-balance sheet obligations and contingent obligations to pay or to deliver or to provide 
collateral, including obligations from received funding, made commitments, derivates or re-
purchase agreements, but excluding obligations which can only be enforced during the liqui-
dation of an institution, compared to that institution’s own funds”.
Central European Public Administration Review, Vol. 17, No. 2/2019 77
Intensity of Judicial Review of the European Central Banks’s Supervisory Decisions
vided by the institution’s total exposure”. A notable feature of this tool is 
that the leverage ratio is not calculated according to the riskiness of the in-
stitution’s investments, but rather aims to give a “snapshot” of its leveraged 
investments (i.e. exposures)7. By way of derogation, Commission Delegated 
Regulation 2015/62 on leverage ratio8 introduced the possibility of waiving 
this method of calculating the leverage ratio; paragraph 14 of Art. 429 CRR 
establishes that the competent authority may authorise the credit institution 
to exclude certain exposures to public bodies from its ratio calculation under 
certain circumstances.
In the case in question, six French credit institutions coming under the direct su-
pervision of the ECB had applied to benefit from the exemption under Art. 429 
CRR and exclude from the calculation certain exposures connected to savings 
accounts, such as the Livret A (savings account A)9, underwritten by investors 
at their premises, on the grounds that the French Code monétaire et financier 
required a certain percentage of these deposits to be transferred to the Caisse 
des dépôts et consignations (CDC), a French public financial institution.
The ECB rejected the six applications with six separate decisions stating that, 
although the exposures met the conditions mentioned in Art. 429(14) CRR, 
the supervisor was empowered with a margin of discretion that allowed it to 
refuse exemption on grounds of the risk regarding the safe and sound man-
agement of the supervised entity. In particular, the ECB considered that the 
mechanism by which assets were transferred by the CDC to the credit institu-
tions was imperfect and raised prudential concerns as to the credit institu-
tions’ capital adequacy such as to justify the inclusion of the Livret A expo-
sures in the calculation of the leverage ratio.
The six French credit institutions sought annulment of the ECB decisions 
before the General Court under Art. 263 TFEU. The applicants claimed that, 
firstly, the ECB had erroneously interpreted the relevant legislation, since Art. 
429(14) CRR grants the supervisory authority power to ascertain the exist-
ence of the prerequisites established by the Regulation, but not the power to 
make discretionary decisions thereto, and, secondly, that the ECB had com-
mitted both an error of law and a manifest error of assessment in the inter-
pretation and application of its power of waiver.
On the first claim, the Court confirmed the interpretation favoured by the 
ECB. In the view of the Court, the supervisory authority’s power to exercise 
discretion in its decisions derives not only from the wording of the provision 
but also from its systematic and teleological interpretation. As already evi-
denced in Crédit mutuel Arkéa v ECB10, the CRR Regulation sets out three dif-
7 Recitals no. 90 et seq. of the CRR.
8 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/62 of 10 October 2014 amending (EU) Regula-
tion no. 575/2013 of the European Parliament and Council with regard to the leverage ratio. 
9 The matter concerned especially Livret A, regulated by Arts. L.221-1 to L.221-9 of the Code 
monétaire	et	financier (CMF), livret d’épargne populaire (LEP), regulated by Arts. L.221-13 to 
L.221-17-2 of the CMF, and livret de développement durable et solidaire (LDD), as per Arts. 
L.221-27 of the CMF.
10 EU General Court, judgment of 13 December 2017, Case T-712/15, Crédit mutuel Arkéa v ECB, 
paras. 67 et seq. regarding application of Art. 10(1) CRR. 
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ferent scenarios in which an exemption provision can be implemented: in the 
first, the waiver is automatic as it descends directly from the law, without the 
intervention of the administration; in the second, before granting a waiver 
the supervisor must ascertain the existence of a series of prerequisites in a sit-
uation of “circumscribed powers”; and in the third, the derogation is subject 
not only to the existence of specific prerequisites but also to the discretionary 
judgement of the supervisory authority.
The Court ruled that the controversial provision must be traced to the last 
scheme and interpreted as granting the prudential authority discretionary 
power to choose and weigh up the different aims underpinning the substan-
tive rule governing the leverage ratio.
It was therefore the task of the supervisor to identify the right balance be-
tween two diverging interests: on the one hand, the need to have a compre-
hensive overview of the indebtedness of each credit institution and, on the 
other, the opportunity to take into account effectively low-risk exposures, 
such as specialised lending to public sector entities, that are not the result of 
independent investment decisions by the credit institution.
Against this background, the Court proceeded to examine the second group 
of complaints by conducting an in-depth scrutiny of the reasons stated by the 
ECB11. First, the ECB had considered the accounting treatment of the regu-
lated savings, noting that credit institution’s exposures to that public financial 
institution were booked as liabilities in the institution’s accounts whereas the 
amounts transferred to the CDC were registered in the assets. As a result, the 
ECB had concluded that the credit institutions bore the operational risk linked 
to the savings in question. In addition, the supervisor held that the credit in-
stitutions remained under a contractual obligation to reimburse customers of 
any sums deposited, regardless of the amounts transferred to the CDC, even 
in the event of default of the French state.
The Court held that the ECB refusal was based on considerations which were 
inherent in the exposures concerned by the exemption provision, and that 
the ECB’s interpretation had the effect of rendering such derogation de facto 
inapplicable. Moreover, the Court underlined that the likelihood of the French 
State defaulting did not seem to have been either assessed or even taken 
into adequate consideration by the ECB. As a result, the decision to deny the 
benefit of Art. 429(14) amounted to an error of law since it was based on an 
11  One may argue that the ECB could have raised an exception of illegality pursuant to Art. 277 
TFEU regarding Art. 429(14) CRR, as introduced by the above-mentioned Delegated Regula-
tion 2015/62. Indeed, some concern might be raised as to the legitimacy of this provision in 
terms of its compliance with Art. 290 TFEU, which states that delegated acts “supplement or 
amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative act”. It may in fact be asked whether, 
by introducing a derogation to the CRR with regard to the comprehensive rationale under-
pinning the leverage ratio, the exemption in question impacts an essential element of Art. 
429 CRR. Furthermore, the CRR does not seem to contain any provision attributing power of 
waiver to the delegated act.
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interpretation of the provision that disregarded the aims underpinning the 
introduction of the waiver, thereby depriving it of any practical effect12.
Finally, the ECB had ruled that the period for the adjustment of the credit 
institution’s positions with those of a public financial institution risked gener-
ating higher leverage ratios that might oblige the banks to sell off assets to 
cover the interim deficit before the transfer of funds by the CDC. The appro-
priateness of this reasoning was closely scrutinised by the General Court. First, 
the Court noted that leverage ratio risks occur when a credit institution pos-
sesses insufficient liquidity. In such circumstances, a credit institution might 
be obliged to take measures not contemplated in its business plan, including 
the forced sales of its assets, in order to ensure higher liquidity. The Court 
noted, however, that the ECB decisions regarding the applicants’ liquidity ra-
tio, adopted only a short time before the contested decisions, acknowledged 
that the adjustment period did not constitute a liquidity risk, owing to the 
existence of a guarantee by the central government of a Member State and 
the short duration of the period between the outflows and inflows. The Court 
therefore concluded that the ECB’s arguments stood in contrast to previous 
assessments of the ECB and, thus, based merely on a petitio principii.
In its conclusions, the Court also noted that the adjustment period might im-
pact the leverage ratio only in the event of a “bank run”, a situation typical of 
circumstances of extreme stress. However, the ECB had failed to carry out 
an in-depth examination of the characteristics of the regulated savings and 
had not assessed the likelihood of the bank run event ever taking place. As 
a result, the supervisory authority had failed in its duty to make a thorough 
and impartial examination of all the elements of the case and had adopted a 
manifestly erroneous decision.
4 Discussion: the intensity of the judicial review of ECB 
supervisory decisions
The General Court annulled the contested decisions because the ECB made 
an erroneous use of its discretion. According to the General Court, the ECB 
had erroneously interpreted the exemption provided for by Art. 429(14) CRR 
and, subsequently, unreasonably excluded its application on grounds incom-
patible with the underlying aim of the provision. The Court’s reasoning can be 
broken down into two parts.
First, the Court assessed the correctness of the interpretation of the legal 
provisions governing leverage ratio, with regard to their rationale and scope 
of application. In that respect it is well known that, under Article 19 TEU, EU 
judges must ensure that, in the interpretation and application of the Treaties, 
EU law is observed. Accordingly, the administration does not enjoy a margin 
of discretion when interpreting EU law. The ECJ has the duty to carry out a 
12  See also Case C-256/15, Nemec, paras. 48 and 49; C-407/07, Stichting Centraal Begeleidingsor-
gaan, para. 30; C-8/01, Taksatorringen, para. 62, where the Court of Justice made it clear that 
a provision containing an exemption may not be interpreted in such a restrictive manner as to 
deprive it of any practical effect, namely render it inapplicable.
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full review of the interpretation favoured by the administration and, if it disa-
grees, the Court can substitute its interpretation for that of the administra-
tion (P. Craig, 2010, p. 400).
These judgments confirm that the ECB, just like the other EU institutions, 
does not enjoy an autonomous margin of appreciation in matters of law in-
terpretation. The interpretation of the relevant legislation by an administra-
tive authority cannot bind the EU courts, which have exclusive jurisdiction to 
interpret EU law even vis-à-vis discretionary powers13. This holds true even if 
the decision under scrutiny involves the interpretation of complex economic 
elements and their legal qualification. According to the EU settled case law, 
factual elements might also come under the comprehensive review of the 
Courts in so far as their assessment is functional to the interpretation of a le-
gal provision (Vesterdorf, 2005; Kalintiri, 2016)14. As the Court stated “whilst, 
in areas giving rise to complex economic assessments, the Commission has a 
margin of discretion with regard to economic matters, that does not mean 
that the Courts of the European Union must refrain from reviewing the Com-
mission’s interpretation of information of an economic nature”15.
A closer look at the Court’s reasoning reveals that a similar test was applied in 
the case under examination. The Court, while scrutinising the ECB’s interpre-
tation of the waiver set out in the CRR, also assessed the factual elements and 
the economic evaluations underpinning such interpretation, concluding that 
the reasons stated by the ECB had the effect of rendering the legal provision 
de facto inapplicable.
The second step of the Court’s reasoning involved judicial review of the dis-
cretion exercised by the ECB in the application of the substantive legal provi-
sions. On this point, the Court referred to the usual “limited standard of re-
view” formula. It is settled case law that when a contested decision has been 
adopted in the exercise of a power of appraisal implying a wide margin of dis-
cretion, the Court’s review cannot substitute assessments coming within the 
remit of the administration, but rather must confine itself to ascertaining that 
the contested decision is not based on materially incorrect facts or vitiated by 
an error of law, manifest error of appraisal or misuse of power16.
Accordingly, the Court did not rule on the prevalence of one interest (rec-
tius: prudential objective) over another and limited itself to identifying the 
existence of elements revealing the incorrect exercise of the ECB’s power of 
appraisal starting from a careful examination of the reasons stated. In other 
words, the Court did not interfere with the “discretion proper” of the ECB, 
13 See, most recently, Crédit mutuel Arkéa v ECB, para. 75. 
14 See, in particular, Case C-42/84, Remia, para. 34; Case C-382/12 P, MasterCard and Others v 
Commission, para. 155; Case C-386/10 P, Chalkor v Commission, para. 62; Case T-286/09, Intel v 
Commission.
15 See Case C-272/09 P, KME Germany and Others v Commission, para. 94; Case C-389/10 P KME 
Germany and Others v Commission, paragraph 121; Case C-386/10 P Chalkor v Commission, 
para. 54.
16 See, ex multis, Case 42/84, Remia; Case T-115/99, SEP v Commission, para. 34; Case T-427/08, 
CEAHR v Commission; Case T-342/11, CEEES et Asociación de Gestores de Estaciones de Servicio v 
Commission.
Central European Public Administration Review, Vol. 17, No. 2/2019 81
Intensity of Judicial Review of the European Central Banks’s Supervisory Decisions
i.e. “its capacity to take policy decisions linked to the weighing of conflicting 
private and public interest” (Caranta, 2008, p. 195).
Instead, the manifestly erroneous nature of the contested decision has been 
inferred from the way the ECB assessed the relevant circumstances within 
the exercise of a technical appraisal. Such control has been conducted on the 
ground of compliance with the general principles and procedural guarantees 
of EU administrative law. It is well established in the EU case law that general 
principles count among the most powerful grounds for scrutinising EU discre-
tionary decisions (Tridimas, 2006). It is no surprise, therefore, that scrutinis-
ing the reasons stated by the authority allowed investigation of the logical 
and legal correctness of the final decision, as well as an in-depth appraisal of 
the discretionary content of the contested measure (Hofmann and Rowe and 
Türk, 2011; Simonati, 2009).
The Court indeed recalled the well-known Technische Universität München 
jurisprudence (Court of Justice, 21 November 1991, Case 269/90, para. 14), 
according to which: “where a Community institution has a wide discretion, 
the review of observance of certain procedural guarantees is of fundamental 
importance”17. Moreover, reference has been made to the principle of sound 
administration according to which the competent institution has the duty to 
examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual 
case (Nehl, 2009; Azoulai and Clement-Wilz, 2014). The EU judicature did not 
confine itself to reviewing the formal and procedural legality of the chal-
lenged decision, according to the “process-oriented review” approach (Len-
aerts, 2012), but also examined whether all the pertinent elements had been 
accurately and impartially considered, and whether the decision contradicted 
previous decisions.
Even though the Livret A judgments do not seem to follow the usual “light 
touch” approach, it is submitted that the General Court did not go so far as 
to step over the ECB’s margin of appraisal. In other words, the CJEU did not 
substitute the ECB’s findings with its own independent assessment of the fac-
tual circumstances, for example, by pointing out the unlikelihood of France 
defaulting or the imminent “run on the bank”.
In sum, the annulment of the contested decisions was posited, on the one 
hand, on the wrong interpretation of the relevant legal provisions and, on the 
other, on the manifestly erroneous nature of the ECB’s assessments. While 
in the scrutiny of the former the Court stuck with the “full review” standard, 
the manifest error of assessment was subject to the “limited review” test. 
The General Court indeed did not encroach on the ECB’s discretion either by 
conducting an autonomous and alternative balancing of interest test, or by 
venturing into the re-assessment of the complex economic appraisals under-
pinning the contested decisions.
17 Similarly, ex multis, Case C-525/04 P, Spain v Lenzig, para. 58; Joined Cases C-258/90 and 
C-259/90 Pesquerias De Bermeo and Naviera Laida v Commission, para. 26. 
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A closer look at the judicial reasoning reveals, however, the General Court’s 
willingness to carry out an in-depth control of the discretionary choices of the 
ECB. This is particularly true vis-à-vis technical appraisals (or “technical discre-
tion”) as the Court tends to blur the (not always clear) distinction between 
control over the interpretation of law on the one hand, and control over the 
application of the legal rules to the facts of the case on the other. In a highly 
regulated matter such as banking law, this allows a particularly thorough scru-
tiny over individual supervisory decisions, but at the same time may soften 
the distinction between “full” and “limited” judicial review18.
Another recent judgment of the General Court provides interesting indica-
tions about the intensity of judicial review on discretionary choices of the 
ECB, notably on the scrutiny of complex economic and technical assessments. 
In Crédit mutuel Arkéa v ECB, the ECB ordered a French credit institution to 
hold additional capital as a result of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation 
Process (SREP) pursuant to Art. 97 of Directive (EU) 2013/36 (the so-called 
CRD IV). The issue at stake was the assessment of the existence of prudential 
risks such that the sound management and the risk coverage by the credit 
institution could not be ensured19. The risk derived, in particular, from the 
likelihood of the credit institution leaving the Crédit mutuel group, a possibil-
ity surmised on account of an ongoing internal conflict within the group.
On examining the claim that the ECB had committed an error of assessment, 
the Court recalled the traditional formula of “limited” or “marginal standard 
of review”, whereby “in the case of complex assessments, the EU authorities 
enjoy, in some areas of EU law, a broad discretion, so that review by the EU 
judicature of those assessments must necessarily be confined to verifying 
whether the rules on procedure and on the statement of reasons have been 
complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether 
there has been any manifest error of assessment or misuse of powers”20.
Nonetheless, the Court’s decision was made on the basis of the stricter test 
developed in the competition and antitrust sector, starting from the well-
known Tetra Laval ruling. In other words, the Court deemed that “not only 
must the EU Courts establish whether the evidence relied on is factually ac-
curate, reliable and consistent but also whether that evidence contains all the 
information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex 
situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn 
from it”21.
18 See the Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi in Case C-382/12 P, MasterCard, para. 119, claiming that this 
approach “has in itself the potential to neutralize de facto the very principle of the recognition 
of a margin of economic assessment to the Commission”.
19 These measures were adopted pursuant to Art. 16(1) letter c), and Art. 16(2), letter a) of the 
SSM Regulation.
20 Arkéa, cit., para. 178.
21 Arkéa, cit. para. 179. Similarly, ex multis, Case C-295/12 P, Telefónica v Commission, para. 54; 
Case C-386/10 P, Chalkor v Commission; Case C-326/05 P Industrias Químicas del Vallés v Com-
mission, para. 76; Case C-525/04 P, Spain v Lenzig, para. 57; Case C-12/03 P, Commission v Tetra 
Laval BV, para. 39.
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Although not substituting the ECB’s evaluation of the bank’s risk profile, the 
Court did in fact proceed to assess individual facts and circumstances that re-
vealed the existence of a conflict between the institution and the group, con-
cluding that any split from the group did not appear so improbable as to vitiate 
the supervisor’s decision on the grounds of a manifest error of assessment.
In conclusion, in this case, too, the Court did not substitute the ECB’s assess-
ment, nor did it go so far as to express a view independent from that of the 
administration. However, this judgment further confirms our first impression 
that, at least in principle, the EU judges seem ready to conduct an in-depth 
appraisal of the ECB’s discretionary choices, examining the reliability of the 
factual elements underpinning supervisory decisions, even vis-à-vis complex 
economic assessments.
5 Conclusions
The Court rulings examined above allow us to draw a few preliminary conclu-
sions regarding the intensity of judicial review of ECB supervisory decisions. 
The first case law seems to indicate that the EU courts intend to adopt an 
approach that goes beyond mere verification of the formal and procedural 
legality of a decision and to scrutinise more closely the administration’s dis-
cretion, understood both as “discretion proper” and as “technical discretion” 
(on this unclear distinction in EU law, Prek and Lefèvre, 2019; Caranta, 2008; 
Schwarze, 2006).
Notably, the Court has not failed to conduct a full judicial review on ques-
tions of law, substituting its own interpretation for that made by the admin-
istration. This is of fundamental importance in a highly regulated sector like 
banking law, where the discretionary powers of the supervisory authority are 
often subject to prior assessment of several technical prerequisites precise-
ly defined by the legislator. At the same time, this leads to the risk that the 
Courts will also apply a full judicial review with regard to the technical assess-
ments carried out by the supervisor, thereby encroaching on its margin of 
(technical) discretion.
The judgments reviewed also confirm the propensity of EU judges to set great 
store by respect for procedural principles and guarantees as a means of ascer-
taining the correct exercise of administrative discretion. Even when consid-
ering the administration’s power of appraisal in technical sectors, the Court 
seems to be adopting a more incisive attitude when assessing whether the 
evidence brought by the administration is reliable, plausible and consistent.
In these terms, despite the new subject matter coming before the EU Courts, 
the judicial review of ECB decisions appears to be aligning with the more con-
solidated approach adopted to examine Commission decisions in competition 
law and state aid. Not only does this approach meet the fundamental require-
ment to provide effective safeguards to individuals whose fundamental rights 
may be infringed upon by supervisory decisions, it also meets the need to “coun-
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ter-balance the far-reaching discretionary powers of the executive” (Schwarze, 
2004) and to support the legitimation and accountability of the supervisor.
These observations allow us to make a more general assumption as to the in-
tensity of judicial review the EU Courts will apply vis-à-vis the acts adopted by 
the ECB. The EU Courts are known to pursue a “flexible judicial review strat-
egy” (Schwarze, 2004), calibrated to the features of each single case and the 
nature of the power exercised. It would therefore not be unreasonable to 
assume that, in principle, the intensity of judicial review of ECB acts will vary 
depending on whether the subject matter falls within the sphere of monetary 
policy or banking supervision (Zilioli, 2017; Lehmann 2017). The EU Courts 
might be expected to continue to adopt a deferent “light touch” approach to 
monetary policy matters, in line with the Gauweiler Case22 and, more recently, 
the Weiss Case23 (Tridimas and Xanthoulis, 2016; Goldmann, 2014). There are 
several reasons for this: the wide institutional mandate enjoyed by the ECB 
in pursuing the objective of price stability; the exquisitely lato sensu politi-
cal nature of monetary measures, requiring a careful balancing of different 
interests; the fundamental need to preserve the stability and reliability of 
monetary decisions; and finally, the infungible nature of the macroeconomic 
assessments carried out by the monetary authority.
Conversely, judicial review of supervisory decisions is likely to be more in-
tense, especially when these decisions are addressed to individuals and do 
not have regulatory effects. In these cases, the ECB acts as a purely adminis-
trative authority and the Court of justice functions as an administrative judge 
(Bertrand, 2015) in charge of protecting individuals’ fundamental rights, such 
as the right to property or the freedom to conduct a business, rather than a 
constitutional court. Its activity does not always involve value judgments or 
policy decisions, as it is often bound by a detailed set of procedural and sub-
stantive rules.
In that respect, a differentiated scrutiny involving varying standards of review 
for different kinds of actions should be adopted. Accordingly, a further dif-
ferentiation could be made between, on the one hand, supervisory measures 
having a general scope (such as regulations, general instructions and guide-
lines) or decisions involving a discretionary weighing up exercise of different 
interests (discretion proper) and, on the other, decisions in mere application 
of legal provisions (circumscribed powers) or, at most, based exclusively on 
highly technical assessments (technical discretion). In the latter two cases, the 
need to preserve the supervisory authority’s margin of appraisal appears less 
pressing, while of utmost importance is ensuring individuals full and effective 
judicial protection.
22 Court of Justice, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler and other, otherwise known as OMT Case. 
23 Court of Justice, Case C-493/17, Weiss and others. 
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